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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is before the Utah Supreme Court upon a grant of writ of certiorari from the 
order, judgment, or decree of the Utah Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction to hear this matter 
is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-
102(3)(a) (1953 as amended), and 78A-3-102(5). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and/or application 
of Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(10)? 
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." 
Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, t 7, 94 P.3d 915, quoting State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
"Whether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact and law. While we defer 
to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, we 
review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, \ 
2, 173 P.3d 223, quoting Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). See also Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("the determination 
of whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation requires the application of the 
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terms of a court order to a given set of facts. This process is in reality a mixed question 
of fact and law, and we are not bound by the conclusion reached by the trial court."). 
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the district court's 
factual determinations? 
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." 
Bowling, 2004 UT 50, | 7, quoting Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199. 
CITATION TO DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Citation to the Utah Court of Appeals decision is Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT 
App74,231P.3d815. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this 
appeal: 
Statutes: 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) and (10) (2010): 
(8)(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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2. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(3) (1985): 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that 
the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex 
unless it is further established by the person receiving alimony that 
the relationship or association between them is without sexual 
contact. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties in this matter were divorced in June of 2006. R at 188: l.1 As part of 
the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner, Becky Sue Myers ("Wife"), was awarded alimony. R. 
at 188-187: 2. 
Respondent, Tracy Lynn Myers ("Husband") filed a Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce on January 31, 2008. R at 94-92. In that Petition, Husband alleged that Wife 
was cohabitating and that Husband could no longer pay alimony, and that alimony should 
be terminated. R. at 94: 3, 4 and 93: 5. On April 30, 2008, Wife filed her Verified 
Answer to Respondent's Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, denying the allegations. R. 
at 146-142. 
A bench trial was held in regard to this matter on July 1, 2008, before the 
Honorable Samuel McVey. R. at 176. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
signed and entered on October 6, 2008. R. at 188-184. An Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce was signed and entered on October 6, 2008. R. at 191-192. In the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated in its conclusions that "[pjursuant to 
1
 There will be two separate citations to the Record on Appeal in this Brief. The court 
record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page number." The Transcript 
of Proceedings shall be referred to as "Tr. page number." 
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Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case terminates upon establishment by 
the Husband that Wife is cohabitating with another person." R. at 184:6. 
As a result, the trial court ordered that "Husband's obligation to pay Wife alimony 
is terminated in this case, effective January 31, 2008." R. at 192: 1. Wife filed an appeal 
timely. R. at 200: 1-2. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. 
Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, 231 P.3d 815. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced in June of 2006. R. at 188:1. Following the divorce, 
Wife moved in with her parents in or around the Spring of 2007. R. at 187:3. While 
living at her parents' house, Wife slept on a couch. Tr. at 12: 24. Wife's parents allow 
foster boys to live with them in the home, and did during the period that Wife was staying 
with her parents. Tr. at 128: 17-19. At the time, a foster child, M.H., was staying at the 
residence. Tr. at 127: 2-4 and 132: 15. While staying there, M.H. had a room that he 
stayed in with another foster child. Tr. at 107: 4-7. Husband alleged that Wife 
cohabitated with M.H., having sexual contact and sharing a common residence with him. 
R. at 93: 5. Husband did not call M.H. to testify. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in its construction or application of Utah 
Code Annotated § 30-3-5(10) and correctly analyzed the case under the two prongs 
required to show cohabitation: (1) common residency and (2) sexual contact akin to that 
2
 Wife denies any allegations that there was a sexual or romantic relationship between 
Wife and M.H. Because M.H. was a minor at the time periods at issue, in order to 
maintain his privacy, the initials M.H. will be used for purposes of this brief. 
4 
existing in a marriage. Husband is incorrect that the Utah Court of Appeals added a third 
prong to the cohabitation analysis; specifically, a prong requiring a trial court to 
determine whether the parties entered into a relationship akin to that existing between 
husband and wife. 
Husband is also incorrect in arguing that the Utah Court of Appeals removed the 
burden shifting element that was present under previous versions of the cohabitation 
statute, which required the payor spouse to show common residency and the payee 
spouse to show a lack of sexual contact. First, the presence of the burden shift was not 
dispositive on this matter on appeal. Second, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct that 
the Utah Legislature removed the burden shift requirement. 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in its review of the district court's factual 
determinations. First, the Utah Court of Appeals did not disturb or disagree with any of 
the findings made by the trial court. Rather, it correctly applied and followed the 
standard of review for termination of alimony cases for cohabitation, disagreeing with the 
ultimate conclusions of the trial court. Second, this Court should ignore Husband's 
arguments that the Court should consider what the trial court could have inferred from the 
evidence, but to which the trial court made no specific findings. Finally, Husband's 




I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
CONSTRUCTION OR APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 30-3-5(10) 
The question of whether or not alimony may be terminated is governed by Utah 
Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(10), which states "[a]ny order of the court that a party 
pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." In the present case, 
the Utah Court of Appeals was correct in its construction and application of this code 
section. Husband's arguments to the contrary are incorrect. First, Husband argues that 
the Utah Court of Appeals added a third prong to the cohabitation analysis as set forth in 
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). Second, Husband argues that the Utah 
Court of Appeals removed the burden shifting element previously provided for by Utah 
Code. Each of these arguments will be examined in turn below. 
A. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ADD A THIRD PRONG TO 
THE COHABITATION ANALYSIS AS SET FORTH PREVIOUSLY BY 
THIS COURT 
Husband argues that the Utah Court of Appeals failed to appropriately construe 
and apply Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(10), and that this is evidenced by the alleged 
addition of a third prong to the traditional two prong test established in Haddow. That 
two prong test requires a showing of (1) common residency, which is defined as "the 
sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more 
than a temporary or brief period of time;" and (2) sexual contact, which "means 
6 
participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing 
between husband and wife." Haddow, 101 P.2d at 672. 
These two prongs support the overarching idea that before alimony will be 
terminated, it is expected that the receiving spouse be engaged in a relationship that is, 
but for the license, a marriage, and concurrently the idea that the parties have begun to 
take responsibility for each other in both an emotional and economic sense. In Myers, the 
Utah Court of Appeals recognized this, stating "[m]aking cohabitation the standard for 
terminating alimony is consistent with alimony's purpose of enabling 'the receiving 
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge.'" 2010 UT App. 74, 
116, quoting Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App. 249, \ 3, 190 P.3d 13. Consider 
also, the comment of the Utah Court of Appeals in Sigg v. Sigg, that 
The two had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses, had open access 
to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, kept 
clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise 
lived as though they were husband and wife. 
905 P.2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). The importance of the idea 
that the parties be living in a relationship akin to a marriage becomes even more clear 
when exploring each of the above two Haddow prongs in turn. 
1. THE COMMON RESIDENCY PRONG 
Common residency is defined as "the sharing of a common abode that both parties 
consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." 
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. In regard to common residency, both this Court and the Utah 
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Court of Appeals have found it helpful to consider such factors as the sharing of living 
expenses, unfettered access to living quarters, sharing of food expenses and meals, and 
storing personal belongings in the other partner's living quarters, in reaching the ultimate 
conclusion of whether two individuals are sharing a common residency for alimony 
termination purposes. 
Also, in Haddow, this Court stated that "[although we do not consider the sharing 
of the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a household to be a requisite 
element of cohabitation, we do find it significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of 
appellant's living expenses or consistently share with her any of his assets." 707 P.2d at 
673. Further, "Mr. Hudson did not contribute anything to appellant's mortgage 
payments, the insurance on her house, or her utility bills." Id. at 673-674. Ultimately, in 
Haddow this Court determined that there was not a common residency present. In 
Pendleton v. Pendleton, the Utah Court of Appeals confirmed that the sharing of living 
expenses is an important, though not a dispositive factor, stating "[ajlthough neither the 
presence of portable possessions nor the sharing of living expenses is dispositive, either 
may nonetheless be indicative of maintaining a shared household and be regarded as 
some evidence of residency." 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In addition, 
"while it is not important if the two share assets in a general sense, it may indeed be 
relevant if one party pays the other's mortgage, the insurance on his or her house, or the 
utility bills-actions which would be quite atypical for a mere visitor, even a regular and 
frequent visitor." Id. at 160-161. In Jensen v. Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found 
that, amongst other factors, the lack of shared expenses was relevant, finding "[t]he 
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evidence does not indicate that Wife shared living or food expenses with Mr. Andrews." 
2007 UT App. 377, ^ 3. In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the 
trial court's determination that there was not a shared residence. Finally, in Sigg, the 
Utah Court of Appeals found the following to be relevant indicators of a common 
residency: 
The two had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses, had open access 
to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, kept 
clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise 
lived as though they were husband and wife. 
905 P.2d at 918 (emphasis added). 
In regard to access to living quarters, in Pendleton, where the Utah Court of 
Appeals did find a common residency, it was relevant that the boyfriend "had his own 
key to Joyce's home," that "he came and went from Joyce's home three to four times 
daily, even when she was not there." 918 P.2d at 161. Consider also Haddow, where this 
Court found the following: 
The trial court made no finding that Mr. Hudson either spent any time at the 
home when appellant was not there or had a key to the house. These 
circumstances seem particularly significant on the question of whether Mr. 
Hudson was living with appellant, since a resident will come and go as he 
pleases in his own home, while a visitor, however regular and frequent, will 
schedule his visits to coincide with the presence of the person he is visiting. 
707 P.2d at 673 (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals also found a common 
residency in Sigg, where despite the fact that a couple had "separate condominiums in the 
same condominium complex," they had "open access to each other's condominiums." 
905 P.2d at 917-918. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found a common residency 
not to exist where the Husband did not have "open access to the Andrewses' home." 
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2007 UT App. 377, U 3. The facts in that case indicated that "Wife lived in the same 
residence as Mr. Andrews off and on for two months, sharing a bedroom with Mr. 
Andrews's sister." Id. at If 2. Further, that "Wife did not have a key to the Andre wses' 
home, had only some of her clothing and toiletries with her during her stay." Id. at f 3. 
Finally, in regard to the storing of personal items in each parties' living quarters 
and the sharing of meals, in Haddow, it was significant that the boyfriend "did not move 
any furniture into appellant's home or keep there any personal items other than toiletry 
articles, a few items of clothing . . . and one picture album.'' 707 P.2d at 673. Further, in 
Jensen, "Wife . . . had only some of her clothing and toiletries with her during her stay." 
2007 UT App. 377, f^ 3. Where a common residence has been established, the Utah Court 
of Appeals found it important in Pendleton that "Joyce and Bill ate almost all meals 
together when Bill was in town-invariably at Joyce's house," and "Bill kept clothing and 
other personal effects at Joyce's home." 918 P.2d at 161. 
The above factors attempt to give substance to the first prong of the two prong test 
established in Haddow, both prongs of which ultimately probe into the overarching issue 
of whether or not, but for the license, a couple has entered into a relationship that really is 
in fact a marriage. It is telling that Husband has declined to quote Haddow in its entirety. 
Specifically, at one point Husband quotes in part, " . . . we do not consider the sharing of 
the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a household to be a requisite 
element of cohabitation . . ." Husband's Brief at pg. 10 quoting Haddow, 707 P.2d at 
673. However, there is a marked difference in the thrust of the sentence when it is quoted 
in its entirety; "[although we do not consider the sharing of the financial obligations 
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surrounding the maintenance of a household to be a requisite element of cohabitation, we 
do find it significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of appellant's living expenses or 
consistently share with her any of his assets." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673 (emphasis 
added). Clearly, while the above factors are not dispositive, they are important in the 
cohabitation analysis as set forth in Haddow, and have remained important since 
Haddow, 
The Utah Court of Appeals has not deviated from the framework set forth in 
Haddow, in fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has issued an opinion that is in line with 
Haddow and its progeny by applying the Haddow standards to the facts present in Myers. 
The issue of cohabitation involves an inquiry that must be examined on a case by case 
basis. At the very heart of Haddow is the idea of whether or not the parties are living in a 
relationship akin to that of a marriage. The Utah Court of Appeals did not add a third 
prong, but instead correctly applied Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) and recognized the 
policy implications of that statute, and this Court's analysis under Haddow. Husband 
argues that the following statement is a deviation from Utah Code and the Haddow test: 
In light of the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that the trial court 
took an unduly narrow view of cohabitation. As noted above, while 
common residency and sexual contact are certainly key to the question of 
whether two people have formed a relationship resembling a marriage - -
most married couples do live together and have at least occasional sexual 
contact - -the inquiry does not end there. A court must take the next step 
and determine whether the parties entered into a relationship cakin to that 
generally existing between husband and wife.' 
Myers, 21010 UT App 74, ^ 17, quoting Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. The above statement 
is not an additional third prong, it is a correct restatement regarding the policy 
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considerations present in Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(10) and this Court's 
interpretation of the statute in Haddow. It is not a simple question of whether the parties 
have the same mailing address, or stay in the same physical residence and whether there 
is sexual contact. It is whether the relationship amounts to the level of that expected in a 
marriage. 
Husband's arguments also exhibit a failure to understand the nature of the test set 
forth in Haddow. In particular, Husband focuses on the common residency prong, 
arguing that "[cjommon residence or domicile need not be akin to that existing between a 
husband and wife." Husband's Brief at pg. 9. It is important to understand what 
Husband is advocating. Husband is advocating that simply having the same mailing 
address is enough. 
This argument completely ignores the economic implications of terminating 
alimony, specifically that "[m]aking cohabitation the standard for terminating alimony is 
consistent with alimony's purpose of enabling 'the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly 
as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge.'" Myers, 2010 UT App. 74, f 16, quoting Ostermiller, 
2008 UT App. 249, f 3. This argument also ignores the factors that this Court established 
in Haddow and that the Utah Court of Appeals has applied in alimony termination cases 
for cohabitation since Haddow. Factors such as the sharing of financial obligations, 
sharing of living quarters, and the sharing of meals. It is true that none of these factors is 
dispositive, and that not every factor will apply to every case, but that does not make 
them irrelevant to the inquiry. The Utah Court of Appeals did not make any of the 
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commonly examined factors a requirement for a finding of common residency. However, 
it did acknowledge a lack of any evidence satisfying any of the factors commonly 
examined, "we have no evidence of shared expenses, shared decision-making, shared 
space, or shared meals." Myers 2010 UT App. 74, ^  18. The Utah Court of Appeals 
correctly recognized that the trial court did not conduct any analysis regarding the 
evidence and these factors. 
Husband also argues that the Utah Court of Appeals failed to "look at the total 
circumstances to decide whether Ex-Wife and her cohabitant lived together." Husband's 
Brief at pg. 10. The argument that a court should "look at the total circumstances" is 
interesting in light of Husband's earlier argument that all that is necessary to satisfy at 
least the common residency prong, is simply to examine whether or not two individuals 
share the same address. Presumably this is the "total circumstances" Husband refers to. 
If simply having the same address were enough, then this Court in Haddow and the Utah 
Court of Appeals for the last twenty five years have been analyzing cohabitation cases 
incorrectly. 
In this case, there was no evidence presented that Wife and Mr. Hart shared living 
expenses, that Wife had free access to Mr. Hart's living quarters, or that Wife ate meals 
regularly with Mr. Hart, shared food expenses with him or kept clothing or other personal 
items in his living quarters. The only evidence regarding a common residency was that 
the two shared the same address for approximately four months. This is not enough. The 
Utah Court of Appeals recognized this and has not added a third prong by making any of 
the factors examined under common residency dispositive, or adding a third prong 
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requiring that a trial court determine if a couple is living together in a relationship akin to 
that generally existing between husband and wife. 
2. THE SEXUAL CONTACT PRONG 
In regard to the sexual contact prong, Haddow has made the importance of 
determining if the parties are living in a marital type relationship explicit. Specifically, it 
requires "participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally 
existing between husband and wife." 707 P.2d at 672. The Utah Court of Appeals did 
not disturb the findings of the trial court, but felt that at best, the evidence showed that 
Wife and M.H. "apparently shared a furtive sexual relationship." Myers, 2010 UT App. 
74, f^ 18. This is not enough to satisfy the second prong of the cohabitation test. While 
Wife disagrees that any sexual contact occurred, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct 
in its analysis that the evidence did not support the conclusion that a relatively permanent 
sexual relationship that would generally exist between man and wife was present. The 
Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied § 30-3-5(10) to this prong as well. 
B. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT REMOVE THE BURDEN 
SHIFTING ELEMENT 
Husband also argues that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in its construction and 
application of Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(10) by allegedly removing the burden 
shifting element that has not been relevant to the cohabitation inquiry, or present in the 
statute since 1995. Two points are compelling in this regard. First, the burden shifting 
element was not dispositive in this case on appeal and is therefore irrelevant. Second, the 
analysis of the Utah Court of Appeals regarding the change in the statute was correct. 
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1. THE BURDEN SHIFTING ELEMENT WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE ON THE 
DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS TO REVERSE THE 
TRIAL COURT 
The burden shifting element was not dispositive on the outcome of this matter on 
appeal, and as such, it should not serve as a basis for reversing the Utah Court of 
Appeals. In its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following regarding the 
impact of the burden shifting element on Myers on appeal: 
We note that the trial court erred in ruling that once Husband proved 
common residency the burden of proving the absence of sexual contact 
shifted to Wife. As explained above, while the pre-1995 statute included 
this kind of burden-shifting mechanism, the current statute does not. It 
places the burden of proving cohabitation on the party seeking to terminate 
alimony. We also note that the evidence on this point was sufficiently 
tenuous that the placement of the burden might have been dispositive 
below. It is not, however, dispositive on appeal. 
2010 UT App. 74, U 18, n6 (emphasis added). While Wife affirmatively states that the 
Utah Court of Appeals did not err in it analysis regarding the Utah Legislature's removal 
of the burden shifting component previously found under § 30-3-5, clearly it was not 
dispositive on this matter on appeal. Therefore, this Court should decline to reverse the 
Utah Court of Appeals on this basis. 
2. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS5 ANALYSIS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 30-3-5 WAS CORRECT 
Despite the fact that the burden shift was not dispositive on this case on Appeal, it 
is important to note that the Utah Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the change to § 30-
3-5 Utah Code Ann. In regard to termination of alimony for cohabitation, prior to 1995, 
Utah Code read, as noted by the Utah Court of Appeals in Myers: 
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Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the 
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. 
However, if it is further established by the person receiving alimony 
that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, 
payment of alimony shall resume. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6) and Myers, 2010 UT App. 74,113. In 1995, the Utah 
Legislature changed that element of the statute. Specifically, as it is now codified the 
statute states, "[a]ny order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). As was stated above, 
the Utah Court of Appeals recognized this clear change and stated in footnote six of the 
opinion that the change in the statute "places the burden of proving cohabitation on the 
party seeking to terminate alimony." Myers, 2010 UT App. 74, Tf 18, n6. 
In regard to issues of statutory interpretation, the "aim" of a court is "to discover 
'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.'" General Security Indem. Co. of Arizona 
v. Tipton, 2007 UT App. 109, \ 17, 158 P.3d 1121 quoting Utah v. Tooele Co., 2002 UT 
8, f 10, 44 P.3d 680 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, "[t]he plain 
language of the statute provides . . . the road map to the statute's meaning, helping to 
clarify the intent and purpose behind its enactment." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 
52,63P.3d621. 
The plain language of the statute is clear. The burden shifting element existed 
until 1995 when the Utah Legislature decided to remove it. Currently, under the plain 
language of § 30-3-5, alimony may be terminated for cohabitation only "upon 
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establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). The language of the statute is 
unambiguous; the payor spouse must establish cohabitation in order to terminate alimony. 
Currently under established Utah case law, cohabitation requires a showing of "(1) 
common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Pendleton, 
918 P.2d at 160, n.l. Therefore, under a plain language reading of the statute, the payor 
spouse bears the burden of establishing the above two elements of cohabitation. 
Husband argues that the action of the Utah Legislature was simply to "close a 
homosexual loophole, not to make any substantive change to the burden-shifting process 
of establishing cohabitation" and that "sound public policy reasons of promoting 
marriage and discouraging cohabitation, including those voiced by the legislature in 
amending Section 30-3-5(10), support an interpretation of the statute that is consistent 
with an ongoing burden-shifting process." Husband's Brief at pg. 18. Husband 
elaborates on this public policy argument, stating that failure to maintain the burden 
shifting element will result in a situation where "[t]he resulting system will encourage 
deceptive cohabitation and discourage marriage, as payees will live with their boyfriends 
in hidden sexual relationships to collect alimony (rather than marry and have alimony 
automatically terminate)." Husband's Brief at pg. 17. 
Husband's public policy argument misunderstands the point of alimony. The 
purpose of alimony is not to purchase celibacy on the part of the receiving spouse. Its 
purpose is economical, as stated by the Utah Court of Appeals, as it "[enables] 'the 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during 
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the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge.'" Myers, 2010 
UT App. 74, Tf 16, quoting Ostermiller, 2008 UT App. 249, \ 3. Therefore, before the 
receiving spouse can lose an economic benefit, that benefit needs to be supplied in some 
degree by another in most cases, that other being an individual who the receiving spouse 
is living with in a relationship akin to a marriage. 
Husband's argument that the change was made simply to close a homosexual 
loophole is also incorrect. Husband's reasoning does not consider or even address the 
fact that the Utah Legislature clearly intended to change the statute and explicitly 
removed the former burden shifting requirement. Rather, Husband invites this Court to 
somehow insert meaning into the statute that does not currently exist, and was in fact, 
removed. This Court should decline to do so. Even a plain reading of the statute does 
not support Husband's contention. If the Legislature wanted to leave the burden shifting 
requirement from a cohabitation analysis, it could have left it and still closed the 
"homosexual loophole." Rather, the legislature explicitly removed the burden shift. 
Husband attempts to salvage the argument by stating that the Legislature should have 
recognized that Haddow controlled the definition of cohabitation and that by changing 
the statute to its present form was approving the burden shift that was present in Haddow. 
This argument incorrectly describes the responsibilities of the judiciary and legislative 
branches of government, and places the judiciary in a position where it is dictating how a 
statute is put together and fails to give any deference to the law making power vested in 
the legislature. 
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Husband's arguments that a paying spouse would never be able to prove the 
sexual prong of cohabitation are unpersuasive as well. An examination of cohabitation 
case law is telling in this regard. In Sigg, it was admitted that sexual intercourse had 
occurred, specifically, it was admitted that "Haynes had open access to her condominium, 
visited frequently and that they had intercourse." 905 P.2d at 911, n.4. Similarly, in 
another matter, the party who had lost the right to receive alimony "admitted that early in 
her relationship with Dennis Warr, they did have sexual relations and that she gave him a 
venereal disease." Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 533, 534 (Utah 1983). Consider also 
Garcia v. Garcia, where a party admitted that "'she and Ellis shared a bedroom, bed, and 
had sexual contact at that residence." 2002 UT App. 381, \ 2, 60 P.3d 1174. In 
Pendleton, sexual contact was admitted as well, "[i]n this case, sexual contact has been 
admitted." 918 P.2d at 160, n.l. Finally, the cohabitating couple in the Haddow matter 
had "taken a vacation together to Hawaii, 'sleeping in the same bed and having sexual 
relations.'" 707 P.2d at 672. The above situations are what the courts in Utah have 
found satisfactory in regard to proving the sexual prong. Husband complains that this 
requires too much, but does not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the burden 
placed on the paying spouse is impermissible. A paying spouse will be asking a trial 
court to take away an economic benefit bestowed on the receiving spouse, provided in 
part so that the receiving spouse does not become a ward of the State. In light of the 
economic considerations at issue, it does not follow that the burden should necessarily be 
an easy one, or one that the payee spouse should bear. 
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Husband also fails to adequately explain why it is not similarly flawed to require a 
receiving spouse to prove a negative in regard to the sexual prong. A receiving spouse 
would have to prove this prong by testifying themselves with the alleged paramour 
regarding the nature of the relationship. Presumably they could provide false testimony, 
which still does not protect against the harms Husband complains of. 
The Legislature found it expedient to remove the burden shifting element and 
place the burden upon the paying spouse to prove both prongs of the cohabitation test. 
Husband has failed to present decisive arguments that would show otherwise. Therefore, 
this Court should decline to reverse the Utah Court of Appeals on this basis. 
II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN ITS REVIEW OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly reviewed the District Court's factual 
determinations in regard to both prongs of the cohabitation test. The Utah Court of 
Appeals should not be reversed under this issue for three reasons. First, the Utah Court 
of Appeals did not disturb any of the findings of fact made by the trial court. Second, 
Husband's arguments regarding what the trial court could have inferred from the 
evidence are not compelling. Third, Husband's arguments encouraging this Court to 
consider factors not on the record are inappropriate. 
A. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DISTURB ANY OF THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals did not disturb any of the findings of fact 
made by the trial court, it should not be reversed. It is important initially to consider the 
standard of review that was correctly applied in this matter by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
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specifically, "[wjhether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact and law. While 
we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly 
erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" Jensen, 2007 UT App 
377, f 2, quoting Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160. Under this standard, only the factual 
findings of the trial court are given deference. The ultimate conclusion of the trial court 
is reviewed for correctness. 
In order to establish cohabitation, two prongs must be satisfied, (1) common 
residency, which is defined as "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider 
their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time;" and (2) sexual 
contact, which "means participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to 
that generally existing between husband and wife." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. The Utah 
Court of Appeals was required to, and did, look at the facts of this particular case, and 
then decided whether or not they were sufficient to support the ultimate conclusions that 
there was both the "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their 
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time;" and "participation 
in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between 
husband and wife." Id. 
Consider the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter: 
In the late spring and summer of 2007, Wife spent 80% of her nights at her 
parents' home. Her stay there overlapped with M.H.'s stay as a foster 
child. But he shared an upstairs bedroom with one or more male 
roommates while she slept on a couch in the basement. They were 
romantically involved, were 'paired up' at social events, and apparently 
shared a furtive sexual relationship. They treated each other as boyfriend 
and girlfriend. But they did not establish a common household; we have no 
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evidence of shared expenses, shared decision-making, shared space, or 
shared meals. Nor did they maintain 'a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife.' 
Whatever Wife and M.H.'s relationship was, it bore little resemblance to a 
marriage. Accordingly, they were not cohabitating for purposes of section 
30-3-5(10). Terminating alimony on this ground was error. 
Myers, 2010 UT App. 74, ^ J 18. A careful review of this paragraph, and the entire 
opinion, shows that none of the trial court's findings of fact were disturbed or overturned. 
What is evident from the above cited paragraph is that the Utah Court of Appeals found 
as a matter of law that the findings of fact made by the trial court did not support the 
ultimate conclusion of the trial court. The Utah Court of Appeals therefore acted within 
the boundaries of the standard of review and was not in err. 
Many of Husband's arguments regarding the findings of fact reflect a 
misunderstanding of the applicable standard. The issues that Husband raises deal with 
the ultimate conclusions that the Utah Court of Appeals made, not a disruption of the 
factual findings of the trial court. Again, the Utah Court of Appeals did not overturn any 
of the findings, it simply found as a matter of law that the facts did not support the 
ultimate conclusion that Wife and M.H. shared a common residence, or that there was 
sexual contact akin to that existing in a marriage. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS BASED ON SPECULATION AS TO WHAT THE TRIAL 
COURT COULD HAVE INFERRED FROM THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
Husband makes arguments based on what he believes the trial court could have 
inferred from the evidence introduced at trial. For example, Husband states in regard to 
the sharing of meals that "[w]hile there was sufficient evidence that established the 
22 
existence of a common residence without taking testimony on shared meals, the trial 
court could have reasonably inferred that Ex-Wife and M.H. shared meals from the 
undisputed fact that Ex-Wife and M.H. were inseparable. The court of appeals should 
have given the trial judge the benefit of that inference." Husband's Brief at pg. 20, 
internal citations omitted. The trial court made no findings in regard to shared meals. 
Husband essentially faults the Utah Court of Appeals for not making findings for the trial 
court, and further argues that these findings should be based on evidence not on the 
record, but by inference from other evidence. Husband cites to no legal authority for the 
correctness of his assertion. Husband's analysis is simply incorrect, and inappropriately 
faults the Utah Court of Appeals. 
C. HUSBAND'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF 
THE RECORD ARE INAPPROPRIATE 
Husband also argues that this Court should look beyond the record in determining 
whether or not the Utah Court of Appeals was in err. For example, Husband states that 
the Utah Court of Appeals: 
did not witness Ex-Wife shifting nervously on the witness stand as 
she engaged in obvious deception regarding the nature of her 
relationship to M.H.; it did not witness the angry glares Ex-Wife 
shot at her son, and the comments she made as her adult son began 
to testify regarding the relationship between Ex-Wife and M.H. -
glares and comments that had an obvious impact on the son, who 
began to change his testimony from his earlier affidavit (the impact 
of Ex-Wife's behavior on her son was so obvious that the trial judge 
stopped the proceedings temporarily, cautioned Ex-Wife to stop, and 
then cautioned the son to start telling the truth). 
Husband's Brief at pgs. 21-22. 
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The inappropriateness of these comments is obvious. Husband asks this Court to 
take his word for actions that may or may not have happened in the court room and that 
are not on the record. At the very least, Husband is presenting his own perceptions of the 
behavior of witnesses, which are irrelevant. Further, in regard to the admonition by the 
trial court to Wife, which is raised by Husband in his Brief, the transcript reads in 
relevant part: 
THE JUDGE: Well, I need you to speak about it because the law says that you must. 
You're a witness, you have to speak about it. Okay. I know you're guarded, right now, 
you're - -
THE WITNESS: So what is my rights to - -
THE JUDGE: Well, you have no rights at this point, sir, other than to tell the truth. That 
is what you're supposed to do is tell the truth. If you don't tell the truth I'll have to hold 
you in contempt and send you to jail until you are willing to tell the truth. 
SPEAKER: (Short inaudible, no mic). 
THE WITNESS: I also have the right - -
THE JUDGE: Ma'am, I'm going to take, whoa, I'm going to take control of this case 
right now. You will not say another word unless your attorney tells you you could say 
another word. 
Tr. at 102:13-25 and 103:1-3. What is evident from this exchange is that a speaker, 
presumably Wife, stated something that was inaudible, and the trial court informed her 
that she was not to speak unless it was appropriate and that her attorney would tell her 
when she could speak. The record does not show, and the trial court does not state, that 
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the admonition is for any purpose other than what is stated above, specifically, it does not 
show that the trial court is admonishing Wife because of the impact she was having on 
her son's testimony. Quite simply, Husband attempts to insert facts onto the record and 
expects this Court to accept his perceptions as true. This is inappropriate and should be 
ignored by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Wife respectfully requests that this Court uphold the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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Before Judges McHUGH, ORME, and VOROS. 
OPINION (For Official Publication) 
VOROS, Judge: 
* i 11 1 Petitioner Becky Sue Myers (Wife) appeals the trial court's order terminating alimony on 
the ground that she was cohabitating in her parents' home with her parents' teenage foster son. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 Tracy Lynn Myers (Husband) and Wife were divorced in June 2006, after eighteen years of 
marriage. Wife was awarded alimony. In the months following the divorce, Wife "never had a 
permanent home/' but "bounced all over the place." She stayed with friends, with her daughters, and 
with her parents at their home in Provo, Utah. 
H 3 Her parents' house had three bedrooms, one of which they occupied. The other two bedrooms 
were occupied by as many as six foster boys, including M.H. Grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and 
"ex-foster boys" also slept over from time to time. 
H 4 When Wife stayed with her parents, she slept on a couch in the basement. She also received 
mail at her parents' address. Wife's family members testified that she never lived there, but would 
sleep over intermittently, "maybe once a month." But a private investigator hired by Husband 
observed Wife's car at her parents' house four out of the five days he drove past in June 2007, 
including at least one time early in the morning. Based on this information, the trial court found "the 
most credible and persuasive evidence" to be that Wife "spent at least 80% of her nights" at her 
parents' home, and that it was, in fact, her residence in the spring and summer of 2007. 
H 5 At the heart of this dispute is Wife's relationship with M.H. The trial court heard no direct 
evidence that Wife and M.H. had a sexual relationship. Wife testified that they did not. Husband 
acknowledged that he had no personal knowledge of a sexual relationship between Wife and M.H. 
Neither party called M.H. to testify. 
H 6 Several witnesses described Wife's relationship with M.H. The parties' son (Son) swore in an 
affidavit that he "d[id] not have any doubt" that his mother was having a sexual relationship with 
M.H., that M.H. spoke of Wife "as his girlfriend/' that they "flirt[ed] with each other all the t ime / ' that 
he once saw Wife pretending to be asleep on the couch while M.H. lay on the floor next to the couch, 
that Wife acted jealous when "she thought [M.H.] was hanging out with gir ls/ ' and that he had seen 
M.H. acting "like a heart-broken, love-sick boy." Son also stated that Wife once borrowed his car so 
that she could visit M.H. after M.H. had moved to Salt Lake City. But at tr ial, Son equivocated on 
most of these points, admitting that he had "probably not" read his affidavit before signing it and 
acknowledging that he had no proof of a sexual relationship. 
H 7 The parties' daughter (Daughter) also testified. Daughter's affidavit stated that M.H. and Wife 
"[were] always together whenever I[saw] them." She stated that she began to think there was a 
romantic relationship between Wife and M.H. when Wife asked her to get out of the passenger seat of 
her car so that M.H. could sit there. Daughter also observed them at a family party sitting "side by 
side, ... treating each other as though they were boyfriend and girlfriend," and then leaving together. 
At trial, Daughter confirmed many of the statements in her affidavit and testified that she believed 
Wife and M.H. had a romantic relationship because they fought like lovers rather than friends. 
* 2 U 8 Based on this and other evidence, the trial court concluded that Husband had established 
that Wife and M.H. shared "a common residency." The trial court then ruled that, Husband having 
made this showing, "the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to [Wife]," and that Wife 
"has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact." On the contrary, the court "believe[d] 
that the most credible evidence before the [c]ourt indicate[d] that [Wife and M.H.] had a sexual 
relationship." 
U 9 Having found that Wife and M.H. shared a common residence and had a sexual relationship, 
the trial court concluded it had "no wiggle room to look at equitiesr to look at fairness or anything like 
that," but "must find that under the Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1995 that a condition of 
cohabitation did exist." Accordingly, the court terminated alimony effective January 3 1 , 2008. — 
Wife appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEiW 
"»»<iy »i(>> ***tt>r 
n i ^121 ^111 ^ 11 10 The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
Wife was cohabitating and, consequently, in terminating alimony. "Whether cohabitation exists 'is a 
mixed question of fact and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are 
shown to be clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" Jensen v. Jensen, 
2007 UT ADD 377, 11 2, 173 P.3d 223 (quoting Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 fUtah 
Ct.ADD.1996^. 
ANALYSIS 
H 11 Utah Code section 30-3-5 lists seven factors a court "shall consider" in determining alimony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5f8)fa) (2007 ) .— All but one pertain to financial considerations: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school 
during the marriage. 
Id. In contrast to these mandatory considerations, "the fault of the parties" is at most a factor that 
the court "may consider" in determining al imony.— Id. § 30-3-5(8)(b). 
£41 j d H 12 This statutory scheme makes clear that the principal purpose of alimony is economic, * 
'to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge/ " Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 
2008 UT ADD 249, 11 3, 190 P.3d 13 (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 fUtah 1986)) cert, 
granted, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah Jan. 23, 2009) (No. 20080769); see also Utah Code Ann. 5 30-3-5(8)(d) 
('The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living."). * 'Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband nor a reward to the 
wi fe. ' " English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Nelson 
Divorce and Annulment § 14.06 11-12 (2d Ed.1961 Rev. Vol.)). 
* 3 H 13 Unless a divorce decree provides otherwise, alimony "automatically terminates upon the 
remarriage or death" of the recipient spouse. Utah Code Ann. 5 30-3-5(9). The recipient spouse 
cannot evade this result by merely cohabitating with another rather than remarrying: "Any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Id. 5 30-3-5(10). 
However, this statutory provision has spoken in terms of cohabitation only since 1995. Its 
predecessor statute divided the concept into (1) residing with a person of the opposite sex, and (2) 
sexual contact. See id. 5 30-3-5(6) (1995). I t also split the burden of persuasion; proof of common 
residency shifted the burden to the recipient spouse to disprove sexual contact: 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment 
by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. 
However, if it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
Id. 
H 14 In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), our supreme court interpreted this 
subsection to refer to cohabitation, which in this context means " 'to live together as husband and 
wife / " Id. at 671 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 236 (5th ed.1979); Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 257 (1984) ) .— Thus, the court construed the first statutory factor-residing with a person 
of the opposite sex-to mean "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Id. at 672. The court construed the 
second statutory factor-sexual contact-to mean "participation in a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wi fe." Id. I t thus concluded t ha t " 
'cohabitation' means to dwell together in a common residence and to participate in sexual contact 
that evidences a larger conjugal relationship." Id. at 674. This court has consistently applied this two-
part test. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 161 (Utah Ct.App.1996); Sigg v. Sigg, 905 
P.2d 908, 917-18 (Utah Ct.App.1995). 
H 15 The legislature evidently approved the gloss Haddow placed on the subsection. In 1995, it 
abandoned any reference to the separate factors of common residency and sexual contact in favor of 
Haddow's focus on cohabitation. See Utah Code Ann. 5 30-3-5(8) (Supp.1996). Jettisoned with the 
two factors was the shifting burden of persuasion; since 1995, the spouse seeking to terminate 
alimony bears the burden to establish cohabitation. See id. Even after this amendment, however, our 
cases have continued to see the related concepts of common residency and sexual contact as key in 
determining whether a couple is in fact cohabitating. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, 11 
2, 173 P.3d 223 (citing Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917). Factors bearing on this question include whether the 
parties have keys to a single house, see Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 161, keep their belongings in one 
home, see Sigg, 905 P.2d at 918, share meals and food expenses, see id., and share living expenses 
or assets, see Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671. 
*4 H 16 Making cohabitation the standard for terminating alimony is consistent with alimony's 
purpose of enabling "the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge/' Ostermiller, 
2008 UT App 249, 11 3, 190 P.3d 13 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gavet v. Gavet, 92 
NJ. 149, 456 A.2d 102, 103 fNJ.1983) ("[There is] a policy to end alimony when the supported 
spouse forms a new bond that eliminates the prior dependency as a matter of law/'). Just as the 
award of alimony "is not intended as a penalty against the husband," English, 565 P.2d at 4 1 1 , 
neither is the termination of alimony intended as a penalty against the wife. 
H 17 In light of the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that the trial court took an unduly 
narrow view of cohabitation. As noted above, while common residency and sexual contact are 
certainly key to the question of whether two people have formed a relationship resembling a 
marriage-most married couples do live together and have at least occasional sexual contact-the 
inquiry does not end there. A court must take the next step and determine whether the parties 
entered into a relationship "akin to that generally existing between husband and wife/ ' - ^ Haddow, 
707 P.2d at 672. 
H 18 Wife and M.H. clearly did not have such a relationship. In the late spring and summer of 
2007, Wife spent 80% of her nights at her parents' home. Her stay there overlapped with M.H.'s stay 
as a foster child. But he shared an upstairs bedroom with one or more male roommates while she 
slept on a couch in the basement. They were romantically involved, were "paired up" at social events, 
and apparently shared a furtive sexual relat ionship.-^ They treated each other as boyfriend and 
girlfriend. But they did not establish a common household; we have no evidence of shared expenses, 
shared decision-making, shared space, or shared meals. Nor did they maintain "a relatively 
permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife." Id. at 672. 
Whatever Wife and M.H.'s relationship was, it bore little resemblance to a marriage. Accordingly, they 
were not cohabitating for purposes of section 30-3-5(10). Terminating alimony on this ground was 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
H 19 The trial court erred in concluding that Wife was cohabitating. Although Wife and M.H. 
sometimes slept under the same roof and may have been sexually involved, their relationship did not 
rise to the level of a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. Accordingly, terminating alimony 
on this ground was error. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
H 20 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
FN1. The trial court noted that Husband had not otherwise established a change in 
circumstances that would have "resulted in a termination of alimony based on financial 
consideration." 
FN2. The relevant portions of the Utah Code have not changed since the divorce. Except 
as otherwise noted, we cite to the current version for the reader's convenience. 
FN3. The status of this factor is unclear. In Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, 138 P.3d 84, 
a panel of this court held that a husband's "extramarital affairs and ... prolonged deceitful 
conduct ... presented] precisely the type of situation where the legislature intended the 
trial court to consider fault" and his "fault [went] a long way in explaining the propriety" 
of an alimony award that "would be too high if only economic factors were considered." 
Id. H 23. Three years later, in Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, 223 P.3d 476, a divided 
panel of this court, without purporting to overrule Riley, held that "until the legislature 
clearly defines fault in the statute, it is inappropriate to attach any consequence to the 
consideration of fault when making an alimony award." Id. H 20. As the point is not 
essential to the resolution of the case at bar, we leave for another day the task of 
resolving this apparent "evolution of two conflicting interpretations of the same legal 
doctrine by different panels of judges." State v. Thurman, 846 P,2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 
1993). 
F1M4. One term may have different meanings in different statutory contexts. Thus, as 
used in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the term "cohabitant" includes many categories of 
persons who do not live together as husband and wife. See Utah Code Ann. 5 78B-7-102 
(2) (2008). This court has previously stated that it sees in this broader definition "no 
legislative intent to abrogate the case law defining cohabitation in the alimony-
termination context." Hilly. Hill. 968 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah Ct.App.1998). I t is simply the 
case that "the supreme court has adopted a narrower definition in the alimony-
termination context than the Legislature has in the cohabitant-abuse context." Id . 
FN5. Cohabitation is not the same as so-called common law marriage. While cohabitation 
is one requirement of a valid but unsolemnized marriage, there are others. For example, 
the couple must "hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife." Utah Code Ann. 5 30-1-4.5 f2007). 
FN6. We note that the trial court erred in ruling that once Husband proved common 
residency the burden of proving the absence of sexual contact shifted to Wife. As 
explained above, while the pre-1995 statute included this kind of burden-shifting 
mechanism, the current statute does not. It places the burden of proving cohabitation on 
the party seeking to terminate alimony. We also note that the evidence on this point was 
sufficiently tenuous that the placement of the burden might have been dispositive below. 
It is not, however, dispositive on appeal. Even assuming for purposes of our analysis that 
Wife and M.H. were having sexual contact, they were not living together in a manner akin 
to husband and wife, and thus were not cohabitating for purposes of section 30-3-5(10). 
Utah App.,2010. 
Myers v. Myers 
— P.3d — - , 2010 WL 1236307 (Utah App.), 653 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2010 UT App 74 
Judges and Attorneys (Back to top) 
Judges | Attorneys 
Judges 
• McHugh, Hon. Carolyn B. 
State of Utah Court of Appeals 
Utah 
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Judicial Expert Challenge Report | Profiler 
• McVey, Hon. Samuel D. 
State of Utah District Court, 4th District 
Utah 
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Profiler 
• Orme, Hon. Gregory K. 
State of Utah Court of Appeals 
Utah 
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Judicial Expert Challenge Report | Profiler 
Attorneys 
Attorneys for Appellant 
• Callister, Jeffrey A. 
Murray, Utah 
Litigation History Report | Profiler 
Attorneys for Appellee 
• Black, Guy L. 
Provo, Utah 
Litigation History Report | Profiler 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(c) 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
ADDENDUM B 
GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 801 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
Petitioner, OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
Case No. 064400347 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey 
presiding, on July 1,2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M. 
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard 
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS 
1. Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner alimony is terminated in this 
case, effective January 31, 2008. 
2. The clerk of the court shall pay $ 1,200 of the funds on deposit with the 
OCT Qo 
4TB DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
Court in this matter to Petitioner, by making such payment payable to 
Becky Sue Myers and Samuel M. Barker, and mailing such payment to 
Petitioner's attorney, Samuel M. Barker. 
3. The remaining balance on deposit with the Court in this matter shall be 
paid by the clerk of the court to Respondent, by making such payment 
payable to Tracy Lynn Myers and Guy L. Black, and mailing such 
payment to Respondent's attorney, Guy L. Black. 
4. The Decree of Divorce in this case is hereby modified, consistent with the 
foregoing. 
DATED this b day of . 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
J 
SAMUEL MCVEY J 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE 
Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing document to the 
Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of the mailing certificate 
for this document, plus three (3) days for mailing unless written objection is filed prior to the 
time. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER MODIFYING DECREE to the following, this / 5? day of 
J ^ < - / . 2008: 
7 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84017 
OCT 0 6 ^ J 
GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 ASLr^^& 
GREENWOOD & BLACK uTAH CO'i^ ' 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 801 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Case No. 064400347 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey 
presiding, on July 1, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M. 
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard 
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having considered the evidence before it 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties in this matter were divorced on June 6,2006. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in this case, Respondent was ordered to 
pay Petitioner $1,200.00 per month alimony. 
3. In the late spring and summer of 2007, Petitioner began staying on and off 
at her parent's home in Provo. She testified that she spent nights there on 
the weekends. 
4. There is some dispute as to the number of nights Petitioner spent at her 
parent's home. Some witnesses testified that Petitioner was an infrequent 
guest at her parent's home. However, a private investigator, Mr. 
Hunstman, testified that during the period from June 26, 2007 through 
June 30, 2007, he saw the Petitioner's car at her parent's home on four of 
five days, or 80% of the days he had her under surveillance. The Court 
fmds the most credible and persuasive evidence to be that Petitioner spent 
at least 80% of her nights at her parent's home. 
5. On the 26th of June, 2007, Mr. Hunstman saw Petitioner leave her parent's 
home in the early morning in the company of a young man fitting the 
description of Mike Hart. He saw her drive the young man to 
Independence High School. From this evidence, the Court finds that 
Petitioner and Mike Hart had contact with each other on friendly terms. 
The Court also finds that Petitioner and Mike Hart probably spent at least 
that night in the same house. 
6. It is undisputed that Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents 
during the late spring and summer of 2007. 
7. It is undisputed that Petitioner received mail during the spring and summer 
of 2007 at her parent's home. 
8. It is undisputed that Petitioner listed her parent's home as her address on 
documents she submitted to the court in. a separate criminal case. 
9. Petitioner slept on the downstairs coafcn at her parent's home, often 
arriving there late at night. 
10. Petitioner's parents did not charge her rent. 
11. Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence (e.g., rent receipts, bills, 
etc.) to show that she was living at any other address during the spring and 
summer of 2007. 
12. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court is that 
Petitioner's residence during the spring and summer of 2007 was her 
parent's house. 
13. Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship, paired up with Mike Hart 
and going together with him to events as a couple. 
14. Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent any sexual 
relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they were unable to control 
him and prevent such contact between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner. 
15. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's son discovered his mother alone with 
Mike Hart by the couch downstairs in the home of Petitioner's parents. 
16. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which 
the Court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike 
Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to 
spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City. 
17. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court 
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship. 
18. Respondent has been depositing his alimony payments with the Court for 
the last few months. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner established a residence at her parent's home during the late 
spring and summer of 2007. 
2. Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents during the late 
spring and summer of 2007. 
3. Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency. 
4. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which 
the court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is 
corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with Mike Hart m 
Salt Lake City. 
5. As Respondent has established a common residency between the 
Petitioner and Mike Hart, the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to the 
Petitioner. While Petitioner denies such contact, her actions indicate otherwise. The 
Court concludes that Petitioner has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact 
6. Pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case 
terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is cohabitating with 
another person. 
7. In this case a condition of cohabitation exists, and alimony should be 
terminated effective January 31, 2008. 
8. From the funds on deposit with the Court, one-month's alimony, or 
$1,200.00 should be paid to Petitioner, which will satisfy Respondent's alimony 
obligation to Petitioner through January 31, 2008. The remaining balance on deposit 
with the Court should be paid to Respondent. 
DATED this A day of U f l ^ " 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
U* T>' ---'—7 
SAMUEL MCVEY / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
f 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, this 
U day of ' U CT . 2008: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84017 
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ADDENDUM C 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: | G o T o | 
Utah Code 
Title 30 Husband and Wife 
Chapter 3 Divorce 
Section 5 Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time - Determination of alimony ~ 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — 
Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time --
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every 
decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses 
such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, 
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 
which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or 
dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's 
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and 
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may 
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a 
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of 
one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the 
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition 
which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding 
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage 
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. 
However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume 
if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying ahmony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Amended by Chapter 285, 2010 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 30 03 000500.ZIP 5,376 Bytes 
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ADDENDUM D 
30-3-5 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Power of court to vacate decree of divorce 
or separation upon request of both parties, 3 
ALR 3d 1216. 
Prayer to impress trust upon property or 
otherwise settle property rights, propriety of 
inclusion in bill for divorce or annulment, 93 
ALR 327. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 1975, ch. 
81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 13, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws 
1876, § 1155; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2606. 
The 1969 amendment deleted a provision 
that children ten years of age and of sound 
mind have the privilege of selecting the par-
ent to which they will attach themselves; and 
substituted the fourth sentence of subsec. (1) 
for "Such subsequent changes or new orders 
Standing of strangers to divorce proceed-
ing to attack validity of divorce decree 12 
ALR 2d 717. 
Sufficiency of allegation of adultery in suit 
£ for divorce, 2 ALR 1621. 
 Vacating or setting aside divorce decree 
after remarriage of party, 17 ALR 4th 1153. 
may be made by the court with respect to the 
disposal of the children or the distribution of 
property as shall be reasonable and proper." 
The 1975 amendment added the last sen-
tence of subsec. (1). 
The 1979 amendment added subsecs. (2) 
and (3). 
The 1984 amendment substituted "include 
in it" for "make" in the first sentence of 
subsec. (1); inserted the second and third sen-
tences in subsec. (1); inserted "and health 
and dental care" in the fourth sentence of 
subsec. (1); and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care 
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include 
in every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the pay-
ment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court 
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children. 
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and 
health and dental care, or the distribution of the property as shall be rea-
sonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and 
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child. 
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order 
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automati-
cally terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that 
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony 
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party 
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined. 
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the 
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is 
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship 
or association between them is without any sexual contact. 
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